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Abstract
The Internet is a dangerous place, filled with different cyber threats, including malware.
To withstand this, blacklists have been utilized for a long time to block known infection
and delivery sources. However, through blacklisting the domain names we are leaving a
landscape of threats to be unknown and forgotten. In this paper, first, we investigate
the current state-of-the-art in cyber threats available on such blacklists. Then, we study
the corresponding malicious actors and reveal that those persistently appear since 2006.
By shedding light on this part of the cyber threat landscape we target increased infor-
mation security perception of the landscape from the perspective of the average end-user.
Moreover, it is clear that the blacklisting the domains should not be one-way function
and need to be regularly re-evaluated. Moreover, blacklisting might not be enforced by
client applications in addition to outdated system software leaving real danger. For prac-
tical evaluation, we created a multi-focused experimental setup employing different MS
Windows OS and browser versions. This allowed us to perform a thorough analysis of
blacklisted domains from the perspective of the published information, content retrieved
and possible malware distribution campaigns. We believe that this paper serves as a step-
ping stone in a re-evaluation of the once found and then blacklisted domains from the
perspective of minimal security protection of a general user, who might not be equipped
with a blacklisting mechanism.
1 Introduction
The world wide web has exploded in popularity the last two decades with the last numbers
showing that there are 4.38 billion internet users1. With so many users there are lots of
opportunity for profit, both legitimate and illegal. Internet companies are growing large, Google
which started as a search engine is now one of the largest companies by stock valuation in the
world2, valued at 806.9 billion dollars. Facebook, the largest social network in the world with
over 2.3 billion users3 is valued at 528.9 billion dollars4 on the stock market. With this many
users and potentials for profit, new web portals and innovative applications are created all the
time. Since the use of the internet is so widespread, the level of vigilance is not as high as when
only specialized users used the internet. This makes the internet a good hunting ground for






Study of Malicious Blacklisted Domains Øyvind Jensen, Andrii Shalaginov and Geir Olav Dyrkolbotn
Except for the dark web portals where the users need to use onion networks, other websites
are considered to be publicly accessible. However, such websites that are either legitimate, but
compromised websites or websites created with a malicious purpose are a serious problem to
Internet cybersecurity and safety [16, 20, 7]. Given that these websites can be accessed by
anyone means that people are at risk of being infected (by e.g. drive-by downloads) just by
visiting websites in their (outdated) web browser. To combat this there have been developmental
efforts towards a safer internet by building security features into operating systems, browsers
and routers with e.g. certificates, blacklisting, sandboxing etc. Even with these developmental
efforts towards a safer internet, users are still at risk if they are running old operating systems
or by using old software that are missing protections against attacks. These older operating
systems are typically not running the latest updates since Microsoft Windows XP, Vista, 7
and 8 are out of mainstream support5. This means that they will not get any more updates
and other support and they can be severely outdated. Vulnerable users can be infected with
malicious software which can then lead to these users being part of a botnet or cause other
harm such as financial damages, privacy issues and other liability issues [30].
This paper targets multiple aspects of the overall field of publicly available websites that
are blacklisted. Not every system has automated blacklists handling, therefore, leaving users
susceptible to malicious actions. In particular, we will be looking at all possible aspects of
the DNS-BH blacklist 6. It is the initiative by RiskAnalytics to maintain the list of websites
that are suspected of distributing or propagating malicious software. The focus of this paper
is to understand what is the exact cyber threat landscape of such blacklisted websites. To
comprehensively identify all affiliated risks, we will be looking at the following data: Website
contents, Software from websites, Domain name, Social engineering, Automated analysis.
Our main contribution is an evaluation of the cyber threat landscape on one of the most
famous blacklists, DNS-BH. Specifically, from how a user without security measures will expe-
rience visiting those websites. Blacklists are a useful, albeit old-fashioned and a static defence
mechanism. It has certain limitations, such as it will not update itself, but the website ad-
dresses that are on the list will stay blocked for the users that employ the blacklist. The
website addresses that are on the blacklists are on the lists because someone reported them
as being malicious or spreading malware, or both. We are going to analyze these websites
by looking at their content, software that is both being automatically downloaded and which
you can download from the website, visiting links they have linked to, what servers they are
using, etc. Besides, the focus will be on Microsoft Windows, known for being notoriously sus-
ceptible to malware attacks. To get this insight we will discover topics with topic modelling,
identifying features that can be applicable for machine learning [31], gather intelligence from
various sources and use these parts to create a holistic picture of the cyber threat landscape on
blacklisted domains marked as malicious.
The work in this paper will help both the defenders and the users see what kind of cyber
dangers that are present on the malicious internet. The paper identified that these domains
are not running directly linked malware, which means that it’s a vector that’s less used, if at
all. By exploring what is behind the blacklists we can raise awareness and knowledge of the
threat landscape that is out there for users on malicious domains. The remainder of the paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the adversarial actions that can be affiliated
with malicious websites. Section 3 presents evolution of threats and countermeasures in MS
Windows. Suggested methodology is given in section 4 with experimental setup described in
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2 Current State of the Art: Cyber Threat Landscape on
the Public Internet
To the authors’ knowledge, there has not been done a comprehensive review of the malware
threats, vulnerabilities and risks that are focused solely on blacklisted malicious websites from
an unprotected user’s approach. Moreover, it is important to consider social-technical aspect of
usage of malicious websites. By utilizing major anti-virus vendors’ reports (Microsoft, Syman-
tec, F-Secure) that look at the threat landscape through the view of the organization that has
written them such as [14, 34, 6] we will build an understanding of the general threat landscape
on non-blacklisted websites. The high-level summary of the security reports is shown in the
Figure 1.
These reports identify, enumerate and explain the threats they see in their monitored sys-
tems. The attacked and infected users are customers of the companies that are creating these
reports and thus much of the information they have is sensitive and confidential, even so, there
is much information available in these reports. Furthermore, we can get a more ”ground truth”
perspective on cyber threats when we can see the landscape from major companies in the in-
dustry providing security services and one of the companies that are responsible for one of the
operating systems used by most people in the world7. Combining the findings from the security
reports with our experimental parts helps us to understand threats and the corresponding ma-
licious content that can be found on the websites that are blacklisted and labelled as malicious
by DNS-BH.
2.1 Social Engineering in Cyberspace: Human-related Aspects of Cy-
berthreats
One of the peculiar approaches used on malicious websites is social engineering. The persons
using computer systems are an exploitable part of the computer ecosystem which is easier
than targeting, e.g. the operating system itself. They are the ones setting up exploitable IoT
devices that can be captured by criminals and used in botnets [1], they are also the ones that
can be tricked into visiting malicious websites as seen in [8, 9]. When comparing non-expert
and expert security practices [10] there were multiple interesting findings. The non-expert, the
average user, were more inclined to follow the advice and more norm-like security practices that
were popular around mid-2000s such as browsing known websites and using antivirus solutions.
Not that these practices are necessarily bad, but what is a “known” website can vary extremely
much from person to person. Additionally, antivirus solutions do not necessarily protect end-
users from every threat. This is where the expert practices come into play since one of the most
used practice was updating software. The software can quickly become outdated and some
programs more than others, such as browsers and PDF-readers. By updating these, especially
the browsers, the users can stay protected much more easily by e.g. getting the updates to
blacklists and new features such as multithreaded support and sandboxing as mentioned in
[29]. Another key aspect of personal security on the internet was the handling of passwords. A
non-expert was more prone to often change passwords and instead of using password managers
as the experts, they would try to remember passwords. On the other hand, the expert users
had 2-factor authentication high on the list of important security measures, this is most likely
because it is a much safer way to secure accounts. An attacker will have a much harder time
getting access to both your computer and your phone.
7https://netmarketshare.com/operating-system-market-share.aspx, retrieved 17.5.19
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Figure 1: Summary of cybersecurity reports over last decade
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The social engineering attacks that are most often seen are obfuscated URLs that can
be spread via e.g. Twitter with its 280-character limit, phishing emails, drive-by downloads,
spoofed websites and scareware [9]. Spoofed websites are often part of a phishing phase [8] in
which a fake version of a known website is created, the URL to that fake website is distributed
by e.g. mass mailing and users that access the website can thus be lured into thinking it is the
actual website it is trying to imitate. When a user has opened the website a drive-by download
can occur [5, 9, 33]. This is a successful social engineered attack where a user has been tricked
into visiting this website and gotten malicious files downloaded to their computer.
Drive-by downloads are not the only way a user can get malicious files downloaded on their
computer. Often a user will be enticed by a download button [28] or something similar in which
the graphical user interface has been tailored to exploit the trust the user has to it [9]. A user
could also download software deliberately from a suspicious source that is malicious without
the user knowing it [2]. The downloaded software could be a variety of malware, but often it is
Trojans. Attackers doing social engineering has a goal in mind and that is private information
because that is how they make their salaries as explained in [13] and multiple Symantec reports,
e.g. [40] and [41] in their underground economy sections.
2.2 Technical Aspects of the Threats on the Malicious Websites
The intertwinement of social and cyber threats is understandable when one needs to employ
social engineering to attack a user. Therefore, there has been put many resources into identifying
malicious activity and malicious websites so that the human factor is taken out of the equation.
Browsers should have the defences to be able to stop the user from being exploited built-in
by default, but that is a hard task given how browsers and rendering of websites have been
developed over the years. Sandboxed browsers that can multi-thread has become standard in
the recent years8, but the users that are without this protection and malware that can override
or circumvent the sandboxed environments are still threats. JavaScript and its integration
in browsers as seen in [3, 11, 29] make it possible for malware to attack users through their
browsers with JavaScript. Often, it is malicious code that only exploits particular browser
versions, extension and plug-in combinations. This makes it hard to detect malicious websites
causing them to go undetected and not being blocked by blacklists.
Even with the cloaking capabilities of JavaScript code, there are still ways to detect and
mitigate malicious websites. Authors [4] look at what is the best way for search engines to
intervene against malicious websites. They come up with a solution that makes a website lose
relevancy as a form of punishment when it is detected as bad. This works as a carrot to quickly
respond to the infection and makes it cheaper to detect. Another approach is to use host-based
features and the URLs themselves to create machine learning models that automatically detect
malicious websites [12]. Taking it further than using the basic contents and host-based features
one can use multiple layers as seen in [44], where both the application- and the network-layer
traffic were used to detect malicious websites. Some, [42], have taken it even further by utilizing
more advanced features where they look at combining multiple machine learning methods to
build a huge associative model to detect malicious websites. This approach was mentioned by
[33] where they foresaw a hybrid approach utilizing new technology to build a better detection
solution. It was mentioned in [5] that a combination approach was in the works, but that it
was yet to see daylight.
Recently there has been built a detection model based on combining content on websites and
the path clients take to reach a website. This model was described in [32] where they built it on
8https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/design/sandbox.md
5
Study of Malicious Blacklisted Domains Øyvind Jensen, Andrii Shalaginov and Geir Olav Dyrkolbotn
the features that can be gathered from redirection, HTML and JavaScript. One of the biggest
problems with malicious websites is their evasive nature, where it is very hard to find malicious
data because of environment checks that are being done by these websites. If the visitor does
not have a fingerprint that matches the fingerprints supported by the exploit kit, the malicious
website will hide their malicious data by, e.g. redirecting to a benign site. Their model is
based on a honeyclient9 that collects data and redirect paths on these websites. They designed
it to detect both malicious redirect graphs with exploit URLs and evasion redirection graphs.
Finally, Shibahara et al. [32] categorizes the most common systems for detecting malicious
websites that are utilizing drive-by downloads [4, 12, 44, 33, 5, 32]: Large-scale user traffic,
System behavior and Web content and redirection.
3 Evolution of Cybersecurity Threats and Countermea-
sures in Microsoft Windows
3.1 Noteworthy takeaways from industry reports
The noteworthy takeaways were identified when going through the reports and when we saw
that in some way, they had a big impact on the cyber threat landscape. This enables us to
identify trends and major changes for both the IT industry and the malware industry. Two key
topics that we think of today as given, was fleshed out in 2006 and 2007 already. Both topics
are mentioned already in 2006, the first being that the malware industry is shifting from caring
about their reputation to caring about their coffers and how to fill them with gold instead of
wasting their time for fame. The second topic is a web-based malicious activity, with XSS
attacks being launched at the then famous MySpace.
3.2 MS Windows: operating system security measures
This section is based solely on Microsoft’s Security Intelligence Reports. In these reports we
are presented with insights into the data they are generating from all their users, every nook
and cranny of the operating system is available for these authors. This makes them able to
analyze malware and cyber incidents in a way no other organization like e.g. Symantec and
F-Secure can. Since Microsoft are the ones developing the operating system and the tools that
they include with it they can update and upgrade the different solutions they deliver and get
instantaneous feedback on what is working and what is not.
Table 1: Evolution of MS Windows OS security measures: 2002-2019
Year Major event Description Report
2002 /SafeSEH and /GH
(compiler flags)
In Visual C++ .NET the compiler flags were introduced. These in-




Microsoft started with regular security updates every second calendar
Tuesday of every month. Additionally, they opened for out-of-band
security updates in critical cases.
V. 6 [14]
2004 Windows XP SP2 A major update that introduced new features in Windows such as the
Security Center, improved Windows Firewall, a pop-up blocker in IE
and other configuration options that made the OS safer. DEP was one







Anti-malware software that Microsoft updates monthly through Win-
dows Update and Microsoft Update for free to Windows users.
V. 7 [15]
2006 Windows Vista and
Windows Server
2008
Introduced new features such as UAC and ASLR. V. 7 [15]
9A client that is created with vulnerabilities so that it will be attacked when visiting malicious websites
since it will seem like it can be exploited [26].
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2008 Windows Vista SP1
and Windows Server
2008 RTM
Structured Exception Handler Overwrite Protection (SEHOP) was im-
plemented to stop exception handler exploitation.
V. 8 [16]
2009 Windows 7 and
Windows Server
2008 R2
Safe Unlinking in the kernel pool is an enhancement to kernel security





The Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) was released
in 2009 to be an extra safety layer for Windows XP, Vista, 7, Server








Changed the AutoRun feature to behave like the default in Windows
7. Was pushed in an automatic update.
V. 10
[17]





The infection rates Windows Vista SP1 and SP2 64-bit versions were
higher than the 32-bit versions.
V. 12
[18]
2012 Windows 8 Microsoft added real-time antimalware and antispyware to the default
configuration of Windows 8.
V. 14
[20]
2013 Windows 8.1 Machines upgraded from Windows 8 to Windows 8.1 will have their
default real-time security software changed to Windows Defender if




2013 Internet Explorer 11 IExtensionValidation interface in IE11 introduced a new mechanism
that enables security software to determine if a website is secure before




2014 Updates for Internet
Explorer 8 to 11




2015 Windows 10 and Mi-
crosoft Edge
Microsoft Edge, the default browser in Windows 10, was released with-
out support for Java or other ActiveX plugins.
V. 20
[23]
2015 Windows 10 — Win-
dows Defender acti-
vation
Windows Defender is also automatically activated upon installation if
no other real-time security product is detected. For Windows 8 and
8.1 Windows Defender also gets enabled automatically after a few days
after installation if no other real-time security product is detected.
V. 20
[23]
2015 Windows 10 — Win-
dows Defender cloud
sample submission
If enabled in Windows Defender settings, Windows Defender will up-
load suspicious, but undetected files, to their cloud backend where the
file will be analyzed with machine learning, heuristics and automated
file analysis to determine if it is malicious or not.
V. 21
[24]
2019 Windows 10 — Win-
dows Sandbox
Microsoft introduced a sandbox solution which creates a temporary
version of Windows 10 in which you can install applications or visit
websites which will be run isolated from the host.
[43]
Key security features introduced over the years:
• ASLR - Address Space Layout Randomization
• DEP - Data Execution Prevention
• UAC - User Access Control
• ActiveX controls
• AutoRun in Windows 7
4 Methodology for automated analysis of front-end gen-
erated content on blacklisted websites
This section presents a comprehensive methodology used to collect and analyse data from the
blacklisted malicious websites as shown in the Figure 2.
• Data Collection. Collection of relevant information and files for the future investigation
• Identification of acquired files. A new round of data collection from VirusTotal is used
to acquire: domain, hashes of the files that were collected from the domain, VirusTotal
reports on the file hashes.
• Preliminary automated analysis will go through the collected data done by the crawler
(The overview and functionality of which is shown in the Figure 3).
7
















Figure 2: Flowchart illustrating analysis stages and progression
Figure 3: Automated crawler routine
• Manual domain browsing analysis helps to see what kind of domains that are malicious
and how they look to a normal user. This was recently done in [2] where this gave
additional information about the malware and the delivery process.
• Content analysis aided by automated topic modelling. Each website that is successfully
crawled will most likely have some content in the body section of the HTML-document,
this is the main content which is interesting for us to look at. Topic modelling can thus
help us find commonalities between the websites when we feed all the bodies into a topic
modelling algorithm.
• Result analysis will be used to make prevention guidelines, threat-, risk- and vulnerability
assessments of the domains.
5 Experimental Setup
Because possible malicious websites are going to be analysed, several dedicated Virtual Machines
(VM) were created to address also possible different security measures. The main idea is to
simulate an average end-user environment that might not be updated or patched together with
average user experience and cybersecurity awareness.
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5.1 Data collection
The main data source for this study is a list of websites from DNS-BH blacklist. After analysis
of the list, there was found to be 1,907 relevant to this research domains: 1,139 are labelled as
Malware and 768 are labelled as Malicious. The subsequent analysis includes processing of all
relevant content fetched from the websites and meta-information about the domain name.
5.2 Overall experimental architecture
There have been used two machines as host systems for VMs. One was mostly used when
creating the Cuckoo Host VM while setting it up and configuring the necessary parts. When
the Cuckoo Host VM was ready it was transferred over to the host machine that was going to
run the analysis part. It was imported into VMware where it was configured as a copied VM
and set to work on the new host as shown in the Figure 3.
• Host 1 - Workstation Detailed specifications. OS: Windows 10, Version 1803 (OS Build
17134), CPU: AMD Ryzen 5 2600X @3.6 GHz, Turbo: 4.2 GHz, 6 cores, 12 threads,
RAM: Corsair Vengeance LPX DDR4 16GB 3000 MHz C16, 3 Disk(s).
• Host 2 - Dell Precision M4600 Detailed specifications. OS: Linux Mint 19.1, CPU: Intel
i7-2760QM @2.4 GHz, Turbo: 3.5 GHz, 4 cores, 8 threads, RAM: OEM supplied, DDR3
SDRAM 24GB 1333 MHz, 3 Disk(s)
The main difference from the Host 2 and Host 1 is that the manual analysis VM is not
present. Additionally, the Cuckoo host VM had some small configuration changes made when
running it, some of them to correct issues and some for performance enhancements (related to
several processors and memory, since Host 1 and Host 2 had different quantities of both). On
this system as with Host 1, all VMs did not run at the same time. Instead, the crawler VM
ran till it was finished, then the Cuckoo Host VM ran.
5.3 Linux Guest VMs: initial crawling and analysis
• Manual Analysis VM Used to manually analyze a selection of domains: Linux Mint 19.1,
Firefox 66.0.1 64-bit; RAM: 8GB, CPU: 6 cores, HDD 20GB.
• Crawler VM Used for the crawler: Linux Mint 19.1, RAM: 19.5GB, CPU: 4 cores, HDD
40GB.
5.4 Windows Guest VMs: subsequent sandboxing analysis
• Windows XP SP3 OS specifications: Windows XP, Version: 5.1, Build: 2600, Service
Pack: 3, Browser: Internet Explorer 8.0 (Final). Note that the TLS support for Windows
XP is limited to 1.0 [19] so that websites that are utilizing encryption higher than this will
not work if they do not have backwards compatibility added for Windows XP. Hardware
specifications: (RAM) 2GB, 1 CPU, 127Gbytes HDD
• Windows 7 OS specifications: Windows 7 Enterprise, Build: 7601, Service Pack: 1,
Browser version: Internet Explorer 11.0. Hardware specifications: RAM 4 GB, 2 CPU,
HDD 40 GB.
• Windows 10 OS specifications: Windows 10, Version: 1803, Build: 17134, Browser ver-
sion: Microsoft Edge 42.17134. Hardware specifications: 4GB RAM, 2 CPU, 40 GB
HDD
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UTF-8 Unicode text 250
JPEG image data 247
data 166
XML 1.0 document 76
Table 3: Top 5 file types of all downloaded
files by crawler
6 Evaluation of acquired data and results
This section contains an analysis of the following data:
• Crawler: File type distribution of files downloaded, Number of domains crawled, Number
of domains from blacklist, Content analysis and topic modeling
• Domain data collection: GeoIP - Countries involved, Whois - Distributions, URLAbuse -
BGPRanking
• Cuckoo: Scans statistics
6.1 File and links analysis
The website crawling and data collection resulted in 947 domains, where 668 were unique and
in the blacklist. Some domains had multiple different URLs stored. Listing 2 represents top 5
most resolved domains.
We then gathered the file type information using the file command in Linux which was
gathered by a script written in Python that would call a subprocess and collect the output
for each. By trimming them down we were able to more easily see the file distribution. By
analyzing the data, UTF-8 and ASCII files further we were able to determine that 9 of the
data-files were binary files, but most likely corrupted files where the crawler must have crashed
or timed out during the creation of the files were originally garbled. The rest of the data-files
were HTML-files with encoding issues. Out of the UTF-8 files, 2 were HTML-files the rest were
logfiles created by the crawler. The same was the case with the ASCII files, none of them being
HTML-files, all being logfiles.
Since we found no executables, scripts or similar interesting files in the files directly down-
loaded by our crawler, we checked the office files on VirusTotal, but no engines detected anything
suspicious. We then used the ClamAV10 antivirus engine to do a recursive scan on all fold-
ers within the crawler’s download folder, this includes the files downloaded by the pywebcopy
10https://www.clamav.net/, retrieved 26.05.2019
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Figure 5: ClamAV classification distribution of all downloaded files from the crawler
module that is creating its own folder inside the crawler’s download folder. ClamAV found 58
possible threats after scanning 26,278 files where the classification distribution is shown in figure
5. Distribution of threats is as following: Trojan - 54%, Win.Malware - 33%, PUA - 10% and
Spyware - 3%. Two domains stood out: Domain A - 19 detections of Html.Trojan.Iframe-87
and Domain B - 17 detections of Win.Malware.Iframe-6803839-0.
These threats are typical delivery malware, by being embedded on websites their task is to
infect users with malware, often trojans. Iframes are easily embedded as images you cannot see
with the size specified to 0 and their position rendered in the negatives - outside the browsing
area.
6.2 Textual content analysis on the webpages
Our content analysis started with cleaning our documents then we looked at words used in the
body of all websites. This gives us an indication of the complexity, e.g. if every site was just a
template with ”Error, the server did not respond” when an unsupported fingerprint is detected.
• Without JS rendering enabled Number of non-words (that are occurring more than 100
times): 51. A number of (any) words in the body text that are occurring more than 100
times: 199. A total number of (any) words in body text: 63,806. A total number of
unique words: 131. A number of sites with content: 918.
• With JS rendering enabled A number of non-words (that are occurring more than 100
times): 69. A number of (any) words in the body text that are occurring more than 100
times: 288. A total number of (any) words in body text: 80,019. A total number of
unique words: 188. A number of sites with content: 898.
We further removed the following: duplicate bodies in our data frame, words without (Latin)
characters a-z, A-Z and words with length less than 2. We did not see a clear difference in the
basic word analysis between the pre-duplication removal and the post-duplication removal.
6.3 GeoIP analysis
From the GeoIP, we made a list of the top 5 most represented countries seen in listing 4.
Majority of the websites were hosted in the United States, which can be attributed to the fact
that major cloud providers for shared hosting and dedicated servers are located there.
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Table 4: Top 5 most represented countries
Name Count
Private Person 23
Redacted for Privacy Purposes 7
REDACTED FOR PRIVACY 3
Chen Jianjun 2
SAKURA Internet Domain Registration 2





Table 6: Classification of blacklisted do-
mains in VirusTotal with their respective
count
Anti-Virus Vendor Count





Table 7: Top 5 detections by Anti-Virus
engines
6.4 WHOIS analysis
Since WHOIS data is not reliable, not much weight will be given, but we did do some frequency
analysis on the results from that too, seen in listing 5.
6.5 VirusTotal analysis
VirusTotal had records for all the domains, except 1 in our selection from the blacklist. This
is not surprising given that they are blacklisted for malicious activity. In listing 6 is the clas-
sifications that these domains have in the VirusTotal database from the different vendors that
have data on these domains. Listing 7 shows the top 5 antivirus engines (vendors) that have
data on the domains in question.
6.6 Manual analysis of websites
To select which domains to analyze in our manual analysis we decided to use measures that can
easily be selected and confirmed by others doing similar experiments. The selected measures
were; Cuckoo scores above 4. 5 and VirusTotal reports with more than 4 positive results on the
particular domain. This produced a list of 92 unique domains. To analyze these the Manual
Analysis VM from section 5.3 were used. When browsing these domains, the web console and
network inspector in Firefox were used. The network tab allowed us to see the connections as
they were made, and the inspector tab allowed us to see the source code of the website directly.
This allows us to see and follow network requests and inspect to see if there are iframes or
other hidden parts on the websites. To save our analysis we had an Excel spreadsheet open
with the following columns: domains, descriptions, type, social engineering techniques, private
information requests, reloaded, warning from Google Safe Browsing, links/redirect landings.
Of these columns, the most relevant became the domains, description, type and Google Safe
Browsing. The ”type” column is the determined type of the domain by us when analyzing
and the distribution is shown in figure 6. Additionally, Google Safe Browsing gave following
warnings: ”Yes, deceptive site” - 11, ”Yes, attack site” - 1, ”Yes” (without threat specification)
- 14, ”No” - 67.
To further analyze the domains, the 30 first were checked manually in VirusTotal where
there is an option to get a more detailed view of domains when using their website. This
12
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Figure 6: The types of domains visited during the analysis
Figure 7: Threat categories according to VirusTotal advanced domain information
gives us the following additional information about domains11; categories it has been classified
as, passive DNS replication to get the IP the address resolves to, WHOIS lookup, observed
subdomains, URLs associated with the site (e.g. download links), downloaded files and lastly
the communicating files which communicates with the domain on execution or opening. For the
30 analyzed domains, we saw that 27 of the domains had files in subfolders. This means that
when visiting the domain, you are not seeing the subfolder if it has not been linked to. One
of the most interesting things to get from doing this was the threat categories present on the
analyzed domains as shown in the Figure 7 since these corresponded well with the categories
found in our threat report analysis seen in table 1.
6.7 Final remarks
The collection phase did not result in any dangerous malicious executables one could expect from
malicious domains that are labelled as spreading malware and being malicious. On the other
hand, it lines up with what the landscape has evolved to over the years. A shift that already
started in 2006 towards the internet and the possibilities for exploitation and the increased
attack surface. The notion that you should trust a website was still a thing in 2008 since
Microsoft recommended to ”only browse sites you trust” [14], this notion is abolished today for
11In this example the following domain was used:https://www.virustotal.com/#/domain/shzwnsarin.com,
retrieved 26.5.19
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many reasons, but an obvious one being the advertising networks that are on the majority of
sites you should trust. To get a better understanding of this content we can look at the topic
modelling results which possibly can shine more light on the actual contents. Woocommerce is
one of the most popular commerce plugins for WordPress and the associated words, posted and
contact are regularly seen on webshops. Many of the websites in our dataset are most likely
compromised WordPress sites which have been a target of malware campaigns for a while.
Some malicious detections were made by ClamAV, most of these being iframe-based malware
as seen in figure 5 with the categories being aligned with the categories that the overall landscape
have produced the last 12 years. When we then manually analyzed these domains, we saw
that most of the malware one could download from them was unavailable for direct download
since they resided in subfolders, where 27 of 30 domains are utilizing subfolders for delivery of
malware. There could be multiple reasons for this, they could be malware hosts, or they could
be showing different websites, benign-looking ones, when browsing them manually or with a
crawler. The threats that were found on the detailed VirusTotal domain information again
shows that the blacklisted domains are delivering malware that aligns with the general cyber
threat landscape with trojans being the most popular malware type to deliver. Additionally,
PUAs, hack tools are detected by the tools which are also seen by us on the blacklisted domains.
From the OS usage perspective, Windows XP is not shown in Microsoft reports from 2014
and onward since it had passed the end of life support in 2014 as mentioned in the introduction
of this paper. Even though it is not supported anymore it proved in our small sample size
to be more secure on average than Windows 7 which is a much newer operating system and
used by many more. It could also be that some security features that are mentioned in the
Microsoft Windows operating system and security measures evolution has not been enabled
since by default they are opt-in [16]. Further, without many of these enabled and a bigger
focus on Windows 7 by malware developers, Windows XP could skirt by, even though that is
unlikely since exploits for Windows XP are probably included in the exploit kits by default.
Our Windows XP VM was installed with just the default applications that come with Windows
and updated to IE 8.0 so it might be that the attack surface is limited as recommended by [27]
so that exploits would not exploit it as easily.
Further, the threats we have seen downloaded from our crawler and executed on our VMs
correlates well with other information that Symantec has seen over the years. In their 2018
internet security threat report [41] they say that 1 in 10 URLs are malicious. This is an
interesting fact when setting in perspective with their internet security threat report from 2012
[38] where only 1 in 532 of websites was found to be infected with malware. What this means is
that malware since 2006, have turned towards web-based malware and attacks since that is the
avenue that is their opening. The reasons behind this are that the Windows operating system
has been hardened over many iterations and the newest version has real-time antivirus, security
features such as UAC, ASLR, DEP, kernel unlinking and so on. Even with increased defences,
the attackers have not been resting either since these developmental changes have created an
arms race on both sides. Currently, many malware relies on client applications and human
factor as a way into the system. Symantec has statistics for the malware volume since 2002 to
2018, where a clear shift in malware sample numbers between 2009 and 2010 are shown due to
polymorphism, obfuscation, encryption and the use of simple droppers [35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41].
7 Conclusions and Discussions
In this paper, we have researched the cyber threat landscape on blacklisted malicious domains.
It was shown that this landscape is not substantially different from what is considered the
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general cyber threat landscape by the industry. Even with a limited dataset with many non-
resolving domains we have gathered enough data to see that the focus of malicious domains
is on exploit kits and not on directly spreading malware via direct links to malicious files.
Further, we have shown the broadness of malicious activities on the sandboxed test VMs when
visiting malicious websites. The discovered threats are mainly exploiting kits used by malicious
domains and the most commonly delivered malware are trojans. This means that the most
notorious threats are the ones that are let in by users, often unknowingly since it happens in
the background. By demystifying the landscape, it was further presented that there is not
necessarily a need for users to use any special software other than a solid real-time protection
software that is receiving updates at a regular pace. Besides, by having the most recent and
updated OS version, updated browser with multithreading, sandboxing and a modern API
that a user reduces the risk of being affected. Finally, there is a need for proper cybersecurity
awareness campaigns to be able to reduce such risk even further.
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